enous Afghan force that was to be relocated to Afghanistan at the opportune moment. 10 Ironically, the Soviet occupying forces did not dominate the Hazarjat region in central Afghanistan, the stronghold of the Shi'i community. ' 
CREATING A POLITICAL SPHERE OF INFLUENCE, 1988-1996
Occupying Afghanistan proved infinitely more difficult and costly for the Soviet Union than invading it. Unable to stabilize Afghanistan, the Red Army was forced to leave, accelerating the auspicious collapse of the Soviet Union. In the international negotiations for the Soviet withdrawal, Washington and Moscow had both pledged not to interfere in Afghanistan, which they both considered to be devoid of any economic and strategic value. This doctrine of non-interference and benign neglect created a dangerous vacuum that transformed that country into a lethal battleground for a proxy war among Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan sought to undermine the incumbent Najibollah government and install a friendly, obedient government. Their ambitions, however, exceeded their capabilities. Saudi Arabia saw Afghanistan as an ideological springboard to expand Wahabism throughout Afghanistan and Central Asia, to neutralize Iran's revolutionary message, and to become the leader of the Islamic world. Pakistan's main goal was to install a Pushtun-dominated government, which would ideally accept the Durand line that demarcated the borders between Pakistan and Afghanistan when Pakistan was created and would allow Pakistan to expand its sphere of influence into Central Asia and possibly to become a lucrative bridge connecting Central Asia and the Arabian Sea. Such a government could have also provided Pakistan with a "strategic depth" which it would require in any war with India, its "perennial enemy. "we are prepared to assist you, so that after your departure there will be no US domination in Afghanistan."20 Iran's other objectives were to insure stability on its borders with Afghanistan as it was rebuilding its own shattered economy, to support the establishment of a Tehran-friendly government in Kabul, to reduce the influence of Pakistan and especially Saudi Arabia in Afghanistan, and to transform itself into a critical trade and energy bridge between Central Asia, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf.
Iran consistently called for national reconciliation in Afghanistan and the formation of an inclusive, multi-ethnic government. At the same time, Iran substantially expanded its political sphere of influence by creatively exploiting language as a tool to unify the sizable Dari/Persian-speaking, non-Pushtun minorities. These Dari-speaking minorities thus became a formidable counterforce against the Pushtuns, who were supported by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
To Iran unhesitatingly recognized the new government, which was controlled by the non-Pushtun Dari-speakers. Much to Iran's exasperation, however, the new government neither governed Afghanistan effectively nor saved it from a ferocious civil war. The casus belli of the civil war was ethnic rivalry, reinforced by warlordism. The control of the government by the non-Pushtuns, for example, generated venomous resentment among the Pushtuns, who had historically dominated Afghan politics. Moreover, the polycephalic movement against the Soviet occupation had empowered many ambitious warlords. These warlords exploited ethnic rivalry to advance their own agendas, and formed alliances of convenience with the same rapidity and opportunism that they as soon betrayed.21 They had created their own little fiefdoms and were determined to defy any centralization of authority. Khatami declared that "today, the Afghan nation has a government that is based on its own will ... the stability and security of Afghanistan is the same as our own security and stability."56 Moreover, the two countries signed a number of bilateral agreements dealing with issues ranging from fighting terrorism to economic cooperation.57
The bilateral relations, however, were not devoid of tension. The status of Afghan refugees, estimated to be over 2 million with only 900,000 of them properly identified, was a continuing source of friction between the two neighbors.58 Some refugees returned to their homeland since the fall of the Taliban, but a significant number returned to Iran 
Iran of undermining their country's economic well-being.
From the Iranian perspective, the most contentious issues, however, were opium production in Afghanistan, Karzai's recent campaign to undermine the power of warlords friendly to Iran, and his policy of increasing the Puhstun presence in his government. Afghanistan is producing more opium today than it ever produced under the Taliban, and has the establishment of a stable Afghanistan, free from the Taliban and al-Qa'ida; the reconstruction of that country; and the fight against narcotics. In overthrowing the Taliban and forming a new government, the United States and Iran collaborated at some critical junctures, and in the process established a working model of cooperation. They would be well-advised to take a chapter from that previous playbook, should they decide to negotiate in the future.
Although Iran is in a more favorable strategic position in Afghanistan and in Iraq than it has been in decades, Tehran must remember that the United States has virtually encircled Iran with more than 150,000 troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan. It would be very costly, if not impossible, for Iran to solidify its recent gains as a regional power in one of the most important regions of the world without reaching some kind of understanding with the United States, the world's last hyperpower. In the event of a military confrontation with the US over Iran's nuclear programs, Iran could undoubtedly foment trouble for the US in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and elsewhere. Ultimately, however, Iran would lose disproportionately more than the US in such a conflict. Only through dialogue and negotiation, rather than angry diatribes and confrontation, will Iran and the United States avoid a devastating clash, whose reverberations could be felt throughout the Middle East.
